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Abstract—Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are
an increasing threat on the Internet. One of the reasons is that
websites selling attacks for prices starting from $1.00 are becom-
ing popular. These websites, called Booters, facilitate attacks by
making transparent the needed infrastructure to perform attacks
and by lowering the knowledge to control it. As a consequence,
any user on the Internet is able to launch attacks at any time.
Although security experts and operators acknowledge the poten-
tial of Booters for DDoS attacks, little is known about Booters
operational aspects in terms of users, attacks and infrastructure.
The existing works that investigate this phenomenon are all
restricted to the analysis of a single Booter and therefore provide
a narrow overview of the phenomenon. In this paper we extend
the existing work by providing an extensive analysis on 15 distinct
Booters. We analyze their operational databases containing logs
of users, attacks, and the infrastructure used to perform attacks.
Among our findings we reveal that (i) some Booters have several
database records completely equal, (ii) users that access Booters
via proxies and VPNs performed much more attacks than those
that accessed using a single IP address, and (iii) the infrastructure
used to perform attacks is slightly different from what is known
through existing work. The contribution of our work is to bring
awareness of Booter characteristics facilitating future works to
mitigate this phenomenon.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks aim to make
a target host, service or network unavailable to its intended
users. Those attacks are nowadays the number one threat on
the Internet [1]. In addition, the amount of reported DDoS
attacks increased by 47% compared to year 2013 [2]. One of
the possible reasons for this increase is websites that provide
DDoS attacks as a paid service, referred as Booters.
With a price starting from $1, everyone on the Internet
is able to launch different types of DDoS attacks by using a
Booter [3]. Those websites make their infrastructure transpar-
ent to their users, abolishing the need for technical skills to
perform attacks. The simplicity, effectiveness, and availability
of Booters are making them popular. Booters are becoming
more often involved in attacks [4]. However, little is known
about the operational aspects of Booters, such as who is
accessing Booters, what attacks are requested and what the
Booter backend infrastructure is.
Security experts have identified Booters operational
databases as an effective source of information for getting
a thorough understanding on the operational side of Booters.
Those databases contain Booter operational information, such
as logs of users, attacks, and the infrastructure used to perform
attacks. Existing studies [5], [6], [7], [4], [8], however, are
limited to a same database (i.e., booter.tw). Therefore, aspects
that vary between Booters cannot be observed and a general
overview is missing. For example, Booters can use different
infrastructures types to trigger attacks [9].
Our goal is to provide a comprehensive overview on the
operational side of Booters. To do so, we analyze 15 MySQL
databases of Booters, found on the Internet, in terms of users,
attacks, and infrastructure used to trigger attacks. Our main
contributions are (i) to reveal characteristics of Booter users
responsible for ordering attacks, (ii) give awareness about the
characteristics of attacks ordered by users, and (iii) to shed
light on the infrastructure used by Booters to trigger DDoS
attacks. We believe that an in-depth understanding of how
Booters are engineered can help to carry on mitigation tasks.
We therefore conclude this paper with advices, based on our
analysis, on how Booters attacks can be mitigated.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we survey the characteristics of existent analyses
on Booter operational databases. In Section III, we discuss
about correctness and ethical issues of the databases followed
by a detailed description of the investigated databases. Then,
we analyze the users, attacks, and the infrastructure used by
Booters in Section IV. Finally, in Section V we provide our
final considerations and advices for mitigation.
II. SURVEY OF BOOTER DATABASE ANALYSES
The goal of this section is to survey works that analyzed
Booter operational databases. All works in this section ana-
lyzed the same leaked database of booter.tw (now booter.eu).
This database became public after a series of DDoS attacks
targeting a computer security blog (krebsonsecurity.com) [10]
and the Ars Technica website (arstechnica.com) [11].
First, [5] analyzed booter.tw to investigate the identity
of the user that attacked krebsonsecurity.com. Therefore, the
paper describes the geolocation of this user, the different IP ad-
dresses used to access booter.tw, and the relation between those
IP addresses and the TOR network. In addition, [5] reveals
the amount, duration, and types of consecutive attacks against
krebsonsecurity.com. [6] also describes some characteristics of
the Booter user that attacked krebsonsecurity.com. Beside that,
[6] geolocates the servers used by booter.tw to trigger attacks.
Both works [5] and [6] allow to highlight the importance of
analyzing operational databases to find who commissioned an
attack.
To provide a general overview of booter.tw database, [7]
analyzed the duration and type of all attacks found on the
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TABLE I. SURVEY OF BOOTER DATABASE INVESTIGATIONS.
Investigated aspect Thakorlal [5] R.S. [6] Schwarz [7] Karami [4],[8]
krebsonsecurity.com attack
User geolocation
User under several IPs
User under anonymized IPs
User type (attack duration)
User activity status
User identity
Attack quantity
Attack type
Attack duration
Attack concurrency
Infrastructure status
Infrastructure geolocation
Target geolocation
Target type
Booter profits
Booter new users
database, the geolocation and types of targets, along with
geolocation of booter.tw users. However, the users geolocation
methodology was inaccurate because it did not consider users
using IP anonymization services, such as proxies, Virtual
Private Networks (VPN) services, and TOR’s network.
Finally, two similar works [4], [8] give a comprehensive
understanding of the booter.tw database. However, the authors
did not analyze aspects about the users that could help to
identify the perpetrator. Beside that, and similar to [12], they
analyzed attacks launched against their own infrastructure.
Through this analysis they draw remarkable conclusions about
the characteristics of Booter attacks, such as the amount of
traffic generated by the attacks.
All aspects described above are summarized in Table I.
Although the approaches used in the state of the art are
often similar, and in some cases the analysis methodology is
not completely clarified, we believe that each work presents
valuable novelty on their analysis. However, there is room for
improvement. For example, the way to count Booter users
considering that some of them use a same email should be
taken into consideration; also, the analysis on targets attacked
several times by a same user should be performed to get
a meaningful conclusions about attacks. In addition, more
analysis should be done on the infrastructure used to trigger
attacks. booter.tw based his infrastructure on servers and not on
compromised machines, called as web-shell (more discussion
in Section IV-C). However, some network security specialists
[9] point list of web-shells as the main composition of the
Booter infrastructure.
In general, the main weakness of the existing works is that
they are restricted to booter.tw information. Therefore aspects
such as the possible relation among different Booter attacks
and victims of attacks, that can help to understand Booters and
further mitigate them, cannot be observed. Our work extends
most aspects addressed by previous works to several databases
and correlates those sources of information.
III. BOOTER OPERATIONAL DATABASES
In this section we discuss the ethical aspects on using
Booter operational databases and the authenticity of the data.
After that, we describe characteristics of Booter databases as
outcome of a preliminary analysis.
A. Ethical and consistency considerations
All 15 databases analyzed in this paper were retrieved
from websites that publicly share hacked information on the
Internet, such as pastebin.com and bitleak.net 1. Following the
discussion described in [8] that analyzed booter.tw database,
one of the key points on using hacked information is to use it in
an ethical fashion. Therefore, by using the same methodology
as [8] to overcome ethical issues, we omitted all kind of
personal information, such as email addresses and usernames,
even when these details were known.
Another key issue, also addressed in [8], is the fact that the
data are of unknown provenance. It implies an uncertainty on
the completeness, and on the accuracy of the data. For exam-
ple, [13] by interviewing a Booter owner (asylumstresser.com)
describes that attacks were regularly deleted from the database.
Therefore, each part of our analysis contains discussions about
the consistency of the databases.
B. Overall database characteristics
Each of Booter databases analyzed in this paper contains at
least 100 logs of attacks, which we believe is a representative
number to analyze and compare operational characteristics.
Table II shows an overview of the investigated databases
with a focus on verifying the time period of the available
data records. The table is divided in three parts. The first one
introduces general statistics about the databases, such as the
domain name, the number of attacks, and the date of the first
attack. The second part shows when Booter domain names
have first been observed in DNSDB2 and in DomainTools
(whois.domaintools.com)3 by using their history of domain
names. Both tools have been used to verify the consistency of
the available databases because they keep history of domain
names. The last part of the table compares the differences
between the first attacks in the databases and the oldest dates
according to the two tools used.
According to the first part of the Table II, the dataset span
is not proportional to the number of attacks. For example
booter.tw has smaller dataset span than vaporizebooter.com,
however the number of attacks is the opposite. It means that
popularity is potentially also a factor that influences the usage
of a Booter. However, Booters popularity will not be addressed
in this paper. Another observation in the first part is that the
operation time of those databases starts at least in 2011, such
as for pandabooter.com and vaporizebooter.info. Concerning
these two Booters, we observed that both first attacks were per-
formed exactly at the same moment. However, by comparing
1Although it is straightforward to find those databases, the authors can
provide the URLs to retrieve them.
2DNSDB is an online tool working with Passive DNS data since 2010
allowing requests to analyze the history of a domain name
3DomainTools is a website giving whois information about websites and
keeping an history of it
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TABLE II. OVERALL DATABASE CHARACTERISTICS AND VALIDATION
Booter domain name TotalAttacks
Dataset
span*
[days]
First
attack DomainTools DNSDB
DNSDB -
Domain-
Tools
First
attack -
DomainTools
First
attack -
DNSDB
booter.tw 48844 403 24/01/13 13/07/12 14/12/12 154 195 41
legionbooter.info 38248 134 04/04/13 30/08/11 29/08/11 -1 583 584
pokeboot.com 6915 83 10/12/12 17/10/12 16/10/12 -1 54 55
superstresser.com 5565 36 12/02/14 04/04/13 02/04/13 -2 314 316
national-stresser.com 2756 93 05/09/13 03/05/13 01/05/13 -2 125 127
212-booter.net 1993 57 04/07/13 24/04/13 24/04/13 0 72 72
notoriousbooter.com 879 99 20/01/14 25/04/13 09/04/13 -16 271 287
vaporizebooter.info 725 971 05/09/11 22/05/12 29/09/12 130 -260 -390
xrshellbooter.com 629 41 19/03/12 27/10/11 26/10/11 -1 145 146
flashstresser.net 580 32 24/05/13 25/04/13 16/04/13 -9 30 39
Nullboot.net 343 65 20/01/14 18/11/13 20/11/13 2 64 62
panicstresser.com 209 0 30/07/12 12/07/12 11/07/12 -1 18 19
hazardstresser.com 173 88 15/03/13 27/04/13 11/04/13 -16 -43 -27
vstresser.com 157 423 01/02/13 06/05/13 07/05/13 1 -93 -94
pandabooter.com 104 258 05/09/11 09/05/12 08/05/12 -1 -247 -246
all databases we attested that both Booters share 90 records,
consisting in 28 attacks and 62 records that are related to the
infrastructure used to perform attacks. It means that at least
one of the two Booters reused a database from another Booter.
The only other case of shared records is xrshellbooter.com
having identical records with pandabooter.com (34 records)
and vaporizedbooter.info (4 records), which are related to the
infrastructure.
Considering that we are aware that some Booters have
records removed from their databases [13], we decided to
investigate it by correlating domain names and dates with Do-
mainTools and DNSDB. Firstly, we compare the information
from both tools and confirm that in most cases they report a
similar date, meaning that they observed the same behavior
and then can be trusted. However, two Booters (booter.tw and
vaporizebooter.info) have more than four months of difference.
It could be a consequence of the measurement observation
points of DNSDB and DomainTools. Secondly, in the third
part of the Table II, by comparing the first attack date with
both tools we discovered that for most of them the first attack
was performed several months after the first observation by
the tools. It means that i) either some data was deleted or
ii) the attacks started to be performed after many days that a
Booter was online. However, when the difference is bigger
than months (e.g., legionbooter.info) the first option is the
most suitable. A surprising observation is, once again, about
vaporizebooter.info and pandabooter.com. Both Booters have
attacks occurring long before the Booters have been seen
online by the tools (among a few other Booters). It sustains our
assumption that those Booters potentially copied their datasets
from another Booter that was active a year before and shared
its database or got hacked.
As expected, in a preliminary analysis we found that all
MySQL databases have a similar schema, depicted in the
Fig. 1. This observation helps us to perform a consistent
comparison between Booters.
As depicted in Fig. 1, the generic database schema is
mainly composed of six tables:
• Users: stores personal accounts on Booters, which
contains a username and an email address;
• Logins: contains a set of IP addresses used by a user
to login in a Booter;
Logins
- user
- ip
- time_stamp
Payments
- id
- user
- price
- plan
- time_stamp
- id
- username
- email
Users
- id
- user
- target_ip
- target_port
- attack_type
- duration
- time_stamp
Attacks
1..*
1
1..* 1..*
Infrastructure
- id
- name
- URL /IP add.
Fig. 1. Booter database generic schema
• Payments: consists of the amount of money paid by
users. The amount paid is defined depending on an
arrangement of (i) the maximum duration of attacks
and (ii) a fixed period in which a user can perform
attacks (plan expiration);
• Attacks: stores records of attacks ordered by users.
These logs contain at least three main aspects: (i)
the target’s identifier (e.g., IP address, URL or Skype
username), (ii) the target’s port number, and (iii)
the date of the attack. In addition, some databases
contain further details, such as the attack type, the
attack duration, and the infrastructure used to perform
attacks.
• Infrastructure: stores the list of URLs or IP addresses
of intermediary systems used to launch the attacks
(servers or web-shells).
Although our schema is composed of six tables, in general
Booter databases have more tables. Furthermore, the names
used in databases can be different from what we described on
our schema. However, the structure of all investigated Booter
databases still follows the described schema.
IV. DATABASES ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze and compare the content of
the Booter databases. The analysis is divided in three parts:
users, attacks, and the infrastructure used by Booter to per-
form attacks. Each part has a distinct methodology based on
investigating information of the Booter database tables. Tables
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‘users‘, ‘logins‘ and ‘payments‘ will be used to analyze the
behavior of Booter users (Section IV-A). Table ‘attacks‘ is
used to analyze characteristics of attacks (Section IV-B) and
to compare with the ‘infrastructure‘ table. This last compar-
ison reveals the relation between the attacks offered and the
infrastructure used (Section IV-C).
A. Booter users
First of all, it is important to differentiate users and cus-
tomers of Booters. A user is a person that created an account
on a Booter. A customer is a user that purchased services
on Booters. These two terms are used to differentiate these
two categories in the following sections. Our methodology to
differentiate unique users is based on the email address or
the user unique identifier. Table III summarizes quantitatively
differences between both categories based on the analysis of
the database tables ‘users‘,‘payments‘ and ‘attacks‘.
Table III shows for each database the number of users and
customers, the subgroup of users/customers that performed
one or more attacks (called attackers), and the amount of
money paid by customers to Booters. By comparing different
Booters, the number of attacks neither is proportional to the
number of users nor to the amount of money profited. For
example, booter.tw has far less users (312) and customers
(80) than superstresser.com (2,236 users and 684 customers)
but performed almost 9 times more attacks and earned 1.6
more than the latter. Another observation is that the number
of customers is significantly smaller than the number of users.
It means that many users are just attracted to take a look at
what Booters can offer. Meanwhile a few users are interested
in becoming customers and performing attacks.
The most notable observation on Table III is that the
number of users that performed attacks (users that paid and
launched attacks) is higher than the total number of customers
(except for superstresser.com and panicstresser.com). Although
it is possible that some users had privileges allowing them
to order attacks without paying, it is more likely that some
payments records are missing. The best example that proves
the second hypothesis is showed by superstresser.com, for
which the payment table contains only records from middle
2013, but the attacks records start at the beginning of 2012.
Another observation that emphasizes the removal of
records is the number of customers that launched attacks that
TABLE III. BOOTER USERS OVERALL INFORMATION
Booter Totalusers
User
attacker Customers
Customer
attacker
Profits
[USD]
booter.tw 312 277 80 26 8127.00
superstresser.com 2236 163 684 135 4885.00
pokeboot.com 464 194 96 94 2181.00
panicstresser.com 235 25 57 11 615.00
212-booter.net 140 57 28 24 509.00
national-stresser.com 1892 81 46 - 497.00
hazardstresser.com 79 24 28 - 307.00
flashstresser.net 749 66 13 7 165.00
notoriousbooter.com 81 22 2 - 37.00
nullboot.net 118 26 6 - 31.00
is smaller than the overall number of customers. Although it is
entirely possible that some customers never launch any attack,
we believe this to be unlikely in such a large proportion.
Therefore, we suspect that some users that launched attacks
have seen their payments records removed, preventing them to
be classified as customers.
In the next subsection, we analyze in details the payments
made by customers, the usage of strategies to hide the real
identity of users.
1) Payments: By analyzing the payments characteristics we
give awareness about the customer choices in terms of Booter
offers. Our methodology for this analysis is based on the
payments database table in which is shown at least the amount
paid, the date of the payment, and the email of the customer.
Therefore, 5 Booters that did not provide this information
were excluded from our analysis (i.e., vaporizebooter.info,
legionbooter.info, xrshellbooter.com, vstresser.com, and pand-
abooter.com).
Fig. 2(a) shows, for each Booter separately and on the over-
all of all surveyed databases, how many times users purchase
attacks from Booters. As expected the number of users that did
not pay is far larger than the number of customers. However,
the most surprising information is that a user rarely paid twice
to perform attacks. Note that when a user pays to a Booter,
he is paying to perform as many attacks as he want during a
specific time interval, called as expiration date. Therefore we
can conclude that i) Booter users are satisfied to perform a
set of attacks, or ii) payments records have been removed too
often to observe users buying again later.
By analyzing only Booter customers (not users in general)
%
None 1 >1
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
OVERALL
national-stresser
flashstresser
notoriousbooter
nullbooter
bootertw
212-booter
pokeboot
panicstresser
superstresser
hazardstresser
(a) Payments per user.
%
$0-$5 $5-$10 $10-$50 $50-$357
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
OVERALL
hazardstresser
nullbooter
panicstresser
national-stresser
superstresser
flashstresser
212-booter
booter.tw
pokeboot
notoriousbooter
(b) Amount paid.
Fig. 2. Payment.
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TABLE IV. USER IP ADDRESS(ES) AND ATTACKS
Booter domain name 1 IP 2 IPs ≥3 IPs Sumusers IPs
Total
Users
Attack
related
1 IP
Attack
related
2 IPs
Attack
related
≥3 IPs
Sum
attacks
related IPs
Total
Attacks
booter.tw 64 34 191 289 312 3,392 1,055 44,382 48,829 48,844
legionbooter.info 230 31 29 290 23113 11,053 4,020 2,879 17,952 38,248
pokeboot.com 52 19 40 111 464 503 493 1,091 2,087 6,915
superstresser.com 379 79 141 599 2236 494 832 4,005 5,331 5,565
national-stresser.com 9 5 3 17 1892 64 29 8 101 2,756
212-booter.net 99 21 33 153 140 364 802 815 1,981 1,993
notoriousbooter.com 2 0 2 4 81 29 0 0 29 879
flashstresser.net 522 66 114 702 749 136 89 346 571 580
nullboot.net 5 0 2 7 118 146 0 56 202 343
hazardstresser.com 14 7 8 29 79 21 0 13 34 173
we show in Fig. 2(b) how much they were willing to pay
for attacks. In overall, more than 50% of all customers paid
$5.00 or less to perform attacks. This is an important finding
because the existing works, all based only on booter.tw, have
a slightly different observation about the price charged by
Booters. Through this analysis we highlight that although
Booters offer several prices to perform attacks, the cheapest
ones are the most chosen by users. notoriousbooter.com and
nullbooter.net results are less representative because their num-
ber of customers is very small, 2 and 6 respectively.
Another observation in Fig. 2(b) is that only 4 Booters
offer attacks that were purchased for more than $50. For
those Booters we also found interesting customers outliers.
For example booter.tw earned $3,000 in almost 1 day with
only 2 customers. Our hypothesis to explain this is that it is
most probably due to failure in the payments that lead to a
record but that it is not a real benefit for the Booter (two
email addresses tried repeatedly to pay the exact same amount
during a short period of time). In another extreme we found
6 users in booter.tw database that appeared in the payment
table but in fact paid nothing ($0.00) to perform attacks. It
is explained because this Booter, in special, has promotional
campaigns allowing a user to perform attacks for free.
2) IP adresses, TOR, VPN and proxy usage: The goal of
this section is to analyze how Booter websites were accessed
to figure out if users are trying to hide their activities. This
analysis was motivated by related works (see Section II)
that mentioned Booter users using VPN and proxies. Our
methodology is divided in three steps. Firstly, we observe the
number of unique IP addresses used by each user, assuming
that users logging in using several IP addresses are most likely
using VPN or proxies. Secondly, we focus on analyzing users
that used TOR4 by correlating the IP addresses of logins with
the list of exit-nodes of TOR. Exit-nodes are the exit of the
TOR network to the Internet. TOR exports the list of exit-
nodes every hour since February 2010 and this list can change
through time. At last, we analyze the countries resolved from
the IP addresses. This analysis should emphasize the users
that are using an intermediary service to hide themselves. Our
assumption is that a user can not (in theory) be in multiple
countries around the world in a short period of time. All
analyzes in this subsection are based on investigating the
‘logins‘ table from Booter databases.
Table IV summarizes the number of users that access
4TOR is free software that helps users to defend against traffic analysis and
censorship, that threatens personal freedom and privacy, confidential business
activities and relationships, and state security.
Booters using one, two, and three or more IP addresses. Then,
we show the sum of users that have IP address records stored
in the database to compare with the total number of users. In
the same table, we also show the number of attacks performed
by users that accessed Booters via a single IP address, 2, and
3 or more. At last, we show the sum of attack related to IP
addresses and the total number of attacks.
The first observation is that, in general, the number of users
that access Booters with a single IP address represents the
largest fraction. For example, superstresser.com have almost
2.6 times more users that access Booters with one IP address
than the ones that access with three. A possible reason could
be that most of the users (53%) accessed Booters only once in
the analyzed datasets. However, it is very interesting to observe
that users that access Booters with 3 or more IP addresses
generated far more attacks than the first group. For instance
users that access superstresser.com with three IP addresses
launched almost ten times more attacks than the users that
access them with a single IP address. It means that users that
perform more attacks are more likely to take precautions in
hiding their real IP address.
The exception of having users related to several IP ad-
dresses performing more attacks is legionbooter.info users.
Note that for this Booter the number of attacks related to
one IP is far bigger than related to three IPs. However, the
number of users missing is representative, calculated via the
difference between the total number of users (23,133) and the
users related to IP addresses (290). In addition the difference
between the total number of attacks and the attacks related to
IP addresses is also representative. It gives us indications that
possibly a large number of records were removed. Slightly
different from legionbooter.info, the Booters booter.tw, 212-
booter.net, and flashstresser.net are very consistent, meaning
that (even if some records were removed) the number of users
and attacks matches with the relation of user IP addresses and
the number of attacks related to those IP addresses.
After analyzing the relation between attacks and ways that
users access Booters, we analyze how many of them accessed
using TOR. Table V summarizes our findings.
Table V shows Booter users that used TOR one or more
times to login in a Booter. In addition, the table shows the
number of logins made by those users and how many among
those logins were realized by using TOR. Finally, we describe
the number of attacks launched by those users and the ratio
between attacks and number of users.
We are very surprised to observe that only 4 Booters were
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TABLE V. DETAILS PER BOOTER ABOUT USERS USING TOR
Booter domain TotalUsers
TOR
users
Login
TOR
users*
Login
with
TOR
Attack
TOR
users
Attack
/TOR
users
superstresser.com 2236 8 256 82 205 25,6
booter.tw 312 7 9128 146 3595 513,6
flashstresser.net 749 4 255 13 24 6
xrshellbooter.com 374 1* 1* 1* 26 26
found having users that used TOR. Even more surprised to
notice that the number of users that used TOR to access
Booters (20) is insignificant in comparison to the total number
of users. However, as explained earlier, those users performed
far more attacks than the average of users. For example, the
users that access booter.tw via TOR performed 513 attacks
each, on average (opposed to 31 attacks for all users with
logins information). Note that for xrshellbooter.com we had
only the last login IP address for all users. Even though,
this Booter user performed 26 attacks, that we consider a
reasonable number of attacks.
Note that the number of users that access Booters with
more than 1 IP address (according to Table IV) is far bigger
than the number of users that used TOR. This means that some
users are taking precautions, but also that there are still users
using several IP addresses without using TOR. This does not
exclude that they could also use others services, others VPN
or proxies. We refined the analysis of the count of IP addresses
per user by resolving the addresses to retrieve the Authoritative
Server (AS) and the corresponding country, which has a low
probability to have changed in the last year. Reasoning in term
of countries allows to solve the issue of a user accessing a
Booter from legitimate different locations (home, school, work,
WiFi etc.) and also the dynamic IP addresses allocation from
their ISP.
Table VI shows our findings in terms of geolocation of IP
addresses per countries and attacks. As expected, the number
of user IP addresses related to one country is bigger than the
other two options. It happened because the number of logins
related to one IP address (in Table IV) is also the biggest
one. However, surprisingly most of attacks are related to a
single country, not to ≥3 countries (except for booter.tw).
It means that our assumption that users that access Booters
with different IP addresses are using VPN and proxies is not
completely true. This happens because, as written before in
this section, a user can access from different places where
there is an Internet connection (e.g., home and school). Even
though, it is still clear that some users access Booters via VPN
and proxies because they originated from several countries.
Furthermore, the most important finding showed in Table VI
is that the proportion of attacks by these users, logging in from
several countries, is significantly higher than those logging in
from a single one.
Note that the analysis on countries is much less significant
than on the IP addresses analysis. If we consider that users log-
ging in from a single country are not using any VPN or proxy,
then it could mean that many customers are ordering attacks
without trying to hide themselves. This confirms our previous
hypothesis that minorities of customers are performing more
attacks and are taking precautions. But above all, this also
shows that a large number of customers are performing less
attacks but apparently without taking any precautions. This
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Fig. 3. Attack types
means that their activity could be more easily detected and
mitigated.
B. Attacks
In this section we characterize attacks ordered by Booter
users to provide an overview of what kind of attacks have
been the most chosen. Firstly, we observe the types of attacks
that were recorded in the databases. Secondly, we analyze
how attacks were performed over time (i.e., in consecutive
or parallel way). At last, we study the duration of attacks.
1) Attack types: To investigate the types of attacks the most
chosen by users, we analyze records from the database attacks
table. Since the names of attacks vary from a Booter to another,
we clustered the types of attacks into three categories. Firstly,
UDP-based attacks is a category that includes Distributed
Reflection DoS attacks (DRDoS), such as attacks based on
CharGen, DNS, and NTP, but also what they advertise as
“UDP” which can be a pure UDP flood or any type of
attacks relying on the UDP protocol. TCP-based attacks are the
second category of attacks. It includes SYN flood, “TCP” and
“TCPAMP” attacks. Both categories (UDP and TCP-based)
relying on protocols from the transport and network layer to
perform attacks. The last category is the Application-layer
attacks, which includes RUDY, SLOWLORIS, ARME, and
HTTP-based attacks (HEAD/POST/GET). There are others
types of attacks found in databases but ignored in our analysis
because they were too vague terms to be classified in a
category, such as “SMALL1”, “test”, and “FULL-POWERED-
ATTACK”.
The rationale behind clustering attacks in categories is that
we are aware that Booters advertise some types of attacks but
perform a more specific attack. For example, [4] shows that
although booter.tw advertises attacks as “UDP”, however this
Booter performs DRDoS attacks based on DNS and CharGen.
Note that users are not aware about which specific attack types
are performed by Booters. This information about the attack
performed is restricted to Booter owners.
Fig. 3 shows the sum of all attack types clustered per
category. Note that the number of UDP-based attacks is almost
double than others. It was not surprising that UDP and SYN
flood attacks were the most popular among users. This is
because we expect that Booters follow the same trend of DDoS
attacks on the Internet [1].
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TABLE VI. USER COUNTRIES RELATED TO ATTACKS
Booter domain name 1 Country 2Countries
≥3
Countries
Attacks
related 1
country
Attacks
related 2
countries
Attacks
related ≥3
countries
Attacks / 1
country
Attacks / 3
country
booter.tw 172 57 60 14,131 6,336 28,362 82,2 473
legionbooter.info 272 14 4 15,923 1,171 858 58.5 215
pokeboot.com 81 18 12 1,280 510 297 15.8 25
superstresser.com 499 56 30 2,396 1,735 1,196 4,8 40
national-stresser.com 13 2 2 93 - 8 7.2 4
212-booter.net 146 7 0 1,475 506 - 10.1 -
notoriousbooter.com 3 0 1 29 - - 9.7 -
flashstresser.net 631 49 22 338 150 83 0.5 4
nullboot.net 6 0 1 153 - 49 25.5 49
hazardstresser.com 20 6 3 22 12 - 1.1 -
2) Attacks usage: To understand how users chose attacks
and how often do they perform them, we analyze the history
of attacks for customers. Fig. 4(a) and 4(b) show cumulative
distribution of the overall and over time results, respectively.
According to the overall analysis (Fig. 4(a)), only 6% of
customers performed a single attack. It means that users do not
buy a package of attacks to perform a single attack but to keep
attacking targets, into the period of their package expiration.
Another finding is that 25% of users perform more than 50
attacks, which is a representative number of attacks.
By analyzing attacks over time (Fig. 4(b)) we notice that
38% of users do not perform consecutive attacks. On average,
users performed only one attack per day. It is remarkable that
10% of users that perform more than 13 attacks also performed
consecutive attacks against on a same target (investigated in
the next subsection). We also found some outliers, such as a
single user that ran 2,308 attacks in ∼8 days, which on average
represents 294 attacks per day.
By analyzing attacks on a the same target by a same user
(Fig. 5(a)), we notice that only 22% of the attacks targeted only
once a same target by a same user. Consequently, it means that
most of users performed two or more attacks against a same
target. Note that 67% of the attacks have been launched at
least 10 times on a same target by the same user.
If we analyze the probability for an attack to be re-launched
on the same target less than 5 minutes after the end of the
previous one, we can see that 58% of attacks have been at least
repeated once more, as showed in Fig. 5. The attacks seem to
be chained to produce a longer one, 19% of all attacks are part
of a DDoS campaign of at least 5 consecutive attacks. This
behaviour makes more sense when we analyse the duration of
the attacks. As we can see on Fig. 5(b), attacks are usually
short. 70% of them last less than 10 minutes. An explanation
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Fig. 5. Probability for attacks to be relaunched less than 5 minutes later
for it is that the prices for short term attacks (less than 10 min)
are lower than for longer attacks.
By analysing attacks we also notice that 32% of consec-
utive attacks have been launched in parallel. It indicates that
new attacks against a same target started before the end of a
current one. This means that most of the time, customers are
willing to deal as much damage as possible to their target and
for a longer period of time.
C. Booter infrastructures
Our final analysis on operational Booter databases regards
the infrastructures used to perform attacks. Although previous
works describe the Booter infrastructure as based on servers
(see Section II), by analyzing records from the infrastructure
database table we had a completely different observation on
that. Table VII shows for each Booter the number of web-shells
and servers listed in the infrastructure database table, together
with the types of attacks performed. Note that “UDP(+)”
means that a Booter perform UDP-based attacks including
DRDoS.
Surprisingly, all Booters, except booter.tw, had their infras-
tructure based on Web-shells, which is completely different
from what the related work conclude. Web-shells are scripts
hosted on machines (compromised or not) that are accessed
via HTTP/GET or HTTP/POST and expect parameters to
launch attacks, such as the target’s IP address or URL, the
duration of the attack, the destination port, and (sometimes)
the type of attack. For example, in http://example.com/web-
shell.php?host=yourwebsite.com&time=30&port=80 a web-
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TABLE VII. BOOTER INFRASTRUCTURE
Booter domain name Web-shell Servers Attacks typesGET POST
booter.tw - 15 UDP, TCP, App-layer
superstresser.com 2 - UDP(+), TCP, App-layer
notoriousbooter.com 1 - UDP(+), TCP, App-layer
212-booter.net 1 - UDP(+), App-layer
flashstresser.net 7 - UDP, TCP
panicstresser.com 4 - -
hazardstresser.com 2 - -
legionbooter.info 16 - - UDP(+), TCP, App-layer
vaporizebooter.info 209 - - -
pandabooter.com 466 139 - -
xrshellbooter.com 134 64 - -
shell hosted in example.com will perform an attack against
yourwebsite.com, during 30 seconds, on port 80.
By analyzing the name of scripts we notice that most of
them are PHP scripts5. An interesting observation, showed in
Table VII, is that web-shells (in theory) can cover all types
of attacks (UDP, TCP, and Application-layer attacks), such as
superstresser.com. However, according to [9], DRDoS attacks
can not be covered by web-shells (or at least no web-shell
has been found with these characteristics). It is not possible
(yet) because to perform this type of attacks machines running
web-shells need to have a list of other services that will be
mislead to perform attacks, such as DNS and NTP services. It
means that only Booters that have their infrastructure based on
servers can be used to perform DRDoS attack. Consequently,
it implies that notoriousbooter.com, superstresser.com, 212-
booter.net, and legionbooter.info that perform DRDoS attacks
should also have their infrastructure based on servers but the
URL to access it might be hard coded (written in the source
code), not in the database.
A last observation is that, although booter.tw did not offer
DRDoS attacks, we already wrote in the previous subsection
that this Booter performed DRDoS attacks based on DNS and
CharGen instead of pure UDP attacks. So, it makes even more
sense booter.tw infrastructure is based on servers.
V. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this paper we conducted a structured analysis of 15
Booter operational databases, which allowed us to gain insights
on how Booters are used. Our analysis indicates that Booter
operational databases are often incomplete and sometimes
inconsistent and their content should therefore be used cum
grano salis. For this reason, in several parts of our analysis
we were not able to provide a definitive explanation of our
observations, instead of it, we draw many hypothesis to encom-
pass the uncertainty of those databases. However, we have also
shown that the such operational databases are a valuable source
of information about how Booter are used in practice and offer
valuable insights that can help to mitigate this phenomenon.
The picture that emerges from the analysis conducted in
this paper is that Booters are a phenomenon with very distinct
characteristics. From the one side, we found the majority of
users accessing Booters with a unique IP address, willing to
pay less than $ 10, performing attacks with less then 5 minutes
5The list of web-shells were removed from this paper for legal/ethical
reasons but can be retrieved by requesting the authors
duration, and targeting a few URL or IP addresses. This is
in line with our initial hypothesis that Booters are in use
among users with limited skills. On the other side, we also
found harmful users that hide themselves via VPN and proxies,
accessing Booters using hundreds IP addresses from dozens of
countries, willing to pay several hundreds of dollars to perform
hundreds of attacks per day, often against the same target.
Our recommendations are as follows: i) considering that
most of the users seem to take little precaution when accessing
Booters, we advice to implement URL filtering based on
Booter domain names. This practice has been adopted by our
partners at CERT SURFnet and the University of Twente, and
has successfully stopped several users that access Booters. As
a consequence of this practice, however, the number of users
that access Booters via VPN or proxies (therefore from an
unfiltered connection) might increases.
ii) by using a more effective but more complex mitigation
strategy, we recommend to directly mitigate the Booter in-
frastructure. In particular, we suggest to perform a campaign
against web-shells, since our study shows that web-shells are
currently the preferred infrastructure. Removing web-shells
or blacklisting them is likely to mitigate a large fraction of
the attacks. However, this is not a straightforward task, and
further research is needed for creating and maintaining a
comprehensive list of web-shells.
iii) we advise to mitigate DRDoS. To the best of our
knowledge, web-shells are not able (yet) to perform DRDoS
attacks as they do not contain the list of reflector and amplifier
services (such as DNS, NTP, and CharGen). For this type of
attacks, Booters rely on servers and the possibility of forging
IP addresses (IP spoofing) that do not belong to the originating
network. To overcame this type of attacks we advise the
implementation of Best Current Practice (BCP38) proposed
by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [14]. This practice
proposes an implementation of ingress-filtering rules to block
all traffic from IP addresses that do not belong to the address
space of the originating network.
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